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18. “Bear in mind ... and do not bite the hand that feeds you”: Institutionalized self-
censorship and its impact on journalistic practice in post-communist countries—the 
case of Bulgaria 
Lada Trifonova Price, Lecturer, Sheffield Hallam University, U.K. 
Introduction 
The collapse of Bulgaria’s communist regime in 1989 triggered a process of 
democratization and rapid economic reforms that led to fundamental changes in its 
political and media system. However, transformation has not always been for the 
better, nor has democratization been easy and straightforward (Dobek-Ostrowska, 
2015). Bulgaria has struggled to transform itself from a repressive state to a fledging 
democratic society. A brief initial period of unprecedented media freedom in the early 
1990s allowed its media, like many others in Eastern Europe, to transform from a 
propaganda machine to a catalyst for democratic change. However, the last two 
decades have witnessed constant efforts to bring the media to heel by turning it into a 
powerful tool in the hands of newly emerging political and business elites (Voltmer, 
2013). The consensus among scholars is that since their release from strict communist 
censorship, the media in many post-communist countries have simply become 
mouthpieces of the rich and powerful (Cheterian, 2009; Garcia, 2015; Voltmer, 2013). 
Early research on post-communist societal and media transformation 
(Huntington, 1991; Fukuyama, 1992) assumed that the alliance of democracy and a 
market economy would inevitably lead to the establishment of a Western-type media 
system where media and journalists achieve significant independence similar to that 
enjoyed by their Western counterparts. However, the free market quickly evolved into 
a mechanism that “fuses the circuits of freedom and critical disclosure” (Curran & 
Park, 2000, p. 14), mainly because the new media owners followed their own political 
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and business agendas and were unafraid to use their power to censor criticism of 
governments and corporate partners.  
Rapid liberalization and deregulation of the media market after 1989 brought 
into existence numerous publications, allowing some degree of pluralism and freedom 
of speech (Raycheva, 2009). From being entirely state-owned, all media outlets 
became private except for the two national TV and radio broadcasters Bulgarian 
National Television (BNT) and Bulgarian National Radio (BNR). Introduction of new 
content, styles, and formats, including online versions of major media outlets, ensured 
that—at least on the surface—post-communist newspapers and electronic media had 
nothing in common with their communist-era predecessors. 
Nevertheless, harsh competition and market pressure over the past 20 years, 
including the 2008-2013 global financial crisis have cut advertising income by half 
(Center for the Study of Democracy, 2016). In recent years, print newspapers have 
experienced a sharp drop in circulation and trust, while the advertising market, along 
with the Bulgarian economy, stagnated, bringing the print media to the brink of 
bankruptcy (International Research and Exchanges Board , 2014; CSD, 2016). Still, 
despite severe financial difficulties, print media continue to wield significant political 
influence (CSD, 2016). Often described as “truncheons,” local oligarchs use tabloid 
newspapers, online news sites, and television channels to exert influence, destroy the 
reputations of political and business opponents, and manipulate public opinion 
(IREX, 2017, p. 30). Political interference with the media also plays a major role in 
the dynamic of the country’s media landscape, especially in the case of national 
broadcasters fully dependent on the state budget, turning them into trophies to be 
handed over to whoever wins the election (Jakubowicz, 2012).  
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Since Bulgaria became a full member of the European Union in 2007, its 
media and journalists have witnessed a steady deterioration of freedom of opinion and 
expression. The country has also fallen further in the annual Freedom of the Press 
Index compiled by Reporters without Borders. From 51st place in 2007, it ranked at 
109th in 2017, making it the lowest-ranked EU member “due to an environment 
dominated by corruption and collusion between media, politicians, and oligarchs” 
(Reporters without Borders, or RWB, 2017). Freedom House’s annual Freedom of the 
Press report (2017) rates Bulgaria overall as “free” but its press system as only “partly 
free.” Among the worst problems regularly noted by RWB, the Committee to Protect 
Journalists (CPJ), and other international organizations are attacks on and harassment 
of journalists, especially investigative reporters. Serious threats against journalists 
from Bivol, an investigative outlet, prompted the CPJ to issue an open letter asking 
the prime minister to urgently investigate the threats and ensure the safety of the 
reporters (CPJ, 2015). The state uses its national security agency to silence journalists 
and critical media outlets through coercion to reveal sources, spying, threats, and 
blackmail (Trifonova Price, 2014). This not only amounts to censorship but also leads 
to widespread self-censorship, avoidance of certain topics, and dulling of criticism 
(Blagov, Spassov, Spahr, & Arndt, 2014). In such an unstable environment, editors 
and journalists must carefully decide whether and what to publish or broadcast, which 
in turn shapes how people understand and respond to the social reality around them 
(Voltmer, 2013). As an active participant in the communication process, the media 
require a certain degree of independence to make informed choices about their output. 





The research questions this chapter addresses are: How does censorship 
manifest itself in the media and in Bulgarian journalistic practice post-communism? 
Do journalists self-censor and, if so, why? And what is the impact of different types 
of censorship and self-censorship on journalism and media freedom in Bulgaria?  
Method 
This discussion is based on face-to-face interviews with 31 journalists from a 
range of national media outlets, conducted in 2009 and 2010. The researcher asked 
participants to take stock of the transformation of the post-communist media 
landscape. Twenty-nine interviewees were practicing journalists before the end of the 
communist regime in 1989 and continued their media careers without interruption. 
Most had direct experience of media and censorship before the regime collapsed and 
thus could directly compare their present practices and environment.i Only two 
participants began working as journalists with the start of democratization, although 
both grew up during communism. The sample was drawn to include journalists from 
all types of traditional and new media, including state-operated and privately owned 
outlets. The sample included journalists from 20 electronic, print and online media, 
who were recruited via snowballing and relying on “informal sponsorship” 
(Hammersley & Atkinson, 1983, p. 60) where former colleagues vouched for the 
interviewer and provided access to and contacts with other journalists. The common 
denominator for selecting participants was substantial first-hand journalism 
experience of the changes in the post-communist media landscape.  
The participants were 12 broadcast journalists from each major public and 
private broadcaster (BNR, BNT, and four private TV channels); 12 from the main 
national print media with offices in the capital, Sofia; two from online media; and five 
freelancers who have worked across a number of print and broadcast media. Due to 
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the small size of the media market, identifying details have been limited so 
interviewees can remain anonymous. Since democratization began, many journalists 
have been fired for expressing their views or for not complying with owners’ 
demands. Anonymity allowed participants to candidly share their perceptions, views, 
and observations without fear of identification. 
Findings 
Censorship versus freedom  
One of the most significant changes since the collapse of communism is the 
emergence of freedom of speech and expression. Asked whether freedom of speech 
and expression in Bulgaria exists post-communism, all interviewees agreed that it 
does, in contrast with the stringent party censorship of the past. However, many stated 
they had expected media freedom without any political and economic control and 
interference. Growing market pressure and financial dependency, arising from the 
inability of media organizations to earn sufficient revenue from sales and advertising 
to cover salaries and day-to-day costs, soon dispelled this “romantic” and “somewhat 
naive” illusion. Most editors increasingly rely on sponsorship and handouts from 
owners who bail them out when funds run out. The financial crisis of 2009 brought 
pressure on the media’s financial and technological recourses and caused a collapse of 
the traditional business model (Dobek-Ostrowska, 2015). The absence of financial 
sustainability in turn allows oligarchic groups to accumulate a significant share of the 
media market and to acquire “an unprecedented level of political influence (including 
direct influence on the legislative, executive and judicial powers)” (CSD, 2016, p. 1). 
If the censor holds a monopoly position or belongs to an oligopoly of media barons, 
private censorship can make it very difficult or impossible to communicate critical 
and independent views (Barendt, 2009). Market censors can stifle genuine pluralism, 
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while further alienating marginalized groups in society (Stavljanin & Veljanovski, 
2017). 
All the interviewees noted that public and private media are too financially 
dependent on corporate or state sponsorship to take advantage of their right to report 
and investigate on the public’s behalf. Interviewees described their freedom and 
independence as “relative,” “only on paper,” and “measured.” For example, 
journalists are encouraged to criticize certain issues, individuals, and groups. Yet, 
they cannot touch other subjects that are taboo since reporting on these can hurt the 
business interests of their owners, their political friends, and business partners.  
Journalists believe the media are free because the Constitution guarantees the 
every citizen’s right to receive and disseminate information. However, this 
fundamental right and the official abolition of communist censorship does not ensure 
freedom of speech. According to most interviewees, the existing patronage and 
mutually beneficial patron-client relationships among a close-knit political and media 
elite set boundaries on what journalists can and cannot report. That makes direct 
censorship unnecessary. In other words, media and journalists depend on the whims 
of those who pay the bills. This quote from an editor- in-chief of a daily newspaper 
illustrates this view:  
If before 1989 we could speak of total censorship, where everyone knew what 
you could say and what you could not, now we have different “pockets” or 
“nests” of censorship… The problem is that if the media owners work with 
governments, if they have common interests, this puts the media in conflict of 
interest and affects the journalists’ work. It means that particular media do not 
cover a topic if it may hurt the interests of the owner or if the owner is accused 
of any irregularities.  
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Many interviewees noted that corporate and government censorship are often 
indistinguishable due to the fusion of economic and political power in Bulgaria, 
where the informal alliance among economic and political elites shapes the media 
system (Curran & Park, 2000). Among the most constrictive types of censorship is the 
formation of media outlets as political rather than commercial investments by 
business groups, such as one operated by Delyan Peevski. His New Bulgarian Media 
Group owns six newspapers and controls nearly 80% of print media distribution 
(RWB, 2017). The groups direct funds to media outlets in exchange for positive 
coverage on behalf of the ruling party. The party, in turn, is obliged to deliver favors 
such as lobbying for laws and regulations or securing non-transparent administrative 
decisions that not only benefit the investors financially but also guarantee them a high 
level of political protection. Where the party fails to deliver on its commitments, 
funding immediately ceases and is replaced by smear campaigns and extensive 
negative coverage. A senior newspaper reporter explains how such schemes work:  
Very often agreement for payments is completed by the editor-in-chief, who 
has a circle of political and business friends. They make a special agreement. 
The editor then tries very delicately to talk journalists into covering a specific 
topic, for example. And sometimes journalists are not aware of the agreement. 
The editor-in-chief tells them he has some very important news, which he has 
learned from his sources, and that “news” needs coverage. 
Many interviewees described practices that are less “delicate”—editors 
impose an outright ban on a topic, and journalists who fail to comply are demoted or 
fired. Just over half the interviewees stated that they were fired or forced to resign at 
some point in their careers because of political or corporate pressure applied on them 
personally, via their editors and/or publishers, or through the directors of the national 
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broadcasters. Moreover, all interviewees who work or have worked in broadcasting 
experienced direct political interference from the government. The politically 
appointed directors of the national broadcasters apply pressure to demote or dismiss 
critical journalists. BNR is a high-profile example because of the high number of 
prominent radio journalists fired in its recent history, along with unfair dismissals of 
directors. As a result of direct political interference and full dependency on the state 
budget, BNR has significantly toned down its criticism of the government. BNT also 
depends on the state budget and, according to many interviewees, politicians interfere 
directly and silence critical journalists, as a senior BNT producer explains: 
I have been removed from beats as a reporter covering the government and I 
have been fired at the peak of my career. This was despite my being listed as 
one of the top 10 journalists in the world for that year and my work getting 
international recognition. This didn’t stop them from firing me… The 
campaign against me in certain media involved total lies, fabrications of facts, 
manipulation of people, and all sorts of ways to discredit me personally and 
professionally.  
Many others corroborated this view and noted that an effective way to bully 
and pressure journalists into self-censorship is to discredit them in smear campaigns 
in the tabloid press. Those campaigns known as kompromat usually release fake facts 
and unverified rumors about journalists. Kompromats are often timed to inflict the 
most damage to the target’s reputation. Recently some public figures and journalists 
successfully sued the Monitor newspaper, owned by Peevski’s group for libel and 
defamation. The newspaper accused two civil society activists of paying protesters 
against the prosecutor general, a claim that was not proven in court (IREX, 2017).  
Political, financial censorship, and taboo topics  
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Interviewees pointed to the existence of topics that their media outlets either 
avoid or do not “fully address.” Two of the main reasons are topics that interfere with 
media owners’ business and political interests and lead to fear of violence and 
aggression toward journalists. All interviewees said topics or investigations that may 
interfere with or hurt owners’ business interests or political agendas are “no-go 
zones,” with an “invisible thin line” that cannot be crossed, depending on the outlet. 
This is because most media owners are believed to belong to informal circles, 
described as “networks of influence.” These networks consist of politicians, oligarchs, 
media owners, crime figures, and even prominent journalists. A prime example is one 
of the most powerful networks operated by the notorious parliamentarian and media 
baron Peevski, his sponsor and Corporate Commercial Bank director Tsvetan 
Vassilev, and TV host-turned politician Nikolay Barekov (The Economist, 2014). 
Authorities investigated Barekov’s political party, “Bulgaria without Censorship,” for 
receiving improper financing and for its leader’s ostentatious lifestyle (Capital, 2016). 
Journalists reportedly offer their services to the highest bidder, and those individuals 
are distinguished by their “high material status, their fast rise to wealth, the luxurious 
villas, and the expensive cars,” all manifesting their close links to the people in power 
(IREX, 2017, p. 31). Personal and informal communications within these networks 
have established close, friendly relationships among political actors and some 
journalists (Pfetsch & Voltmer, 2012). In other words, many journalists are part of the 
same elite they are supposed to scrutinize. These networks exhibit strong cultures of 
“favor exchanges,” described by a senior TV producer:  
Since around 2002 there are established networks of prosecutors, 
businessmen, media owners, and politicians, and everything is done on the 
principle “if you do this for me, I will do that for you” or “let’s squash so-and-
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so and destroy so-and-so…” Those are very complicated relationships, which 
are very difficult for most journalists to negotiate. 
On a practical level, exchanges of favors are common, according to this daily 
newspaper reporter: “The way we have to operate usually means reaching a bargain” 
such as ’we will give you information but you have to say good things about us.’” 
Most journalists are resigned to informal, non-transparent arrangements that impact 
their daily reporting practices as “everyday reality.” Journalists dubbed this 
phenomenon as zadkulisie, which translates as “behind the scenes.” For most 
participants, the word represents corrupt media, politics, and business working 
together to undermine democracy and severely threaten media freedom.  
A former newspaper editor-in-chief sums up the complicated dynamics of the 
media landscape as a “minefield where hidden dangers make practicing journalism 
extremely difficult”:  
Everyone looks not to step on each other’s toes, the government’s toes, so-
and-so’s toes and so on.… On the one hand, they are obliged to put pressure 
on some people, and on the other hand they have to be careful not to make 
unnecessary enemies. This precarious position is nothing else but censorship 
on the press—not directly applied censorship but the true economic reality of 
the Bulgarian press.  
Direct political interference pales in comparison with the oligarchy and local media 
barons’ financial control of the media through which they have significantly expanded 
their media portfolios. Several journalists characterized those newspapers as nothing 
more that “propaganda sheets” for their owners.  
Violence, threats, and self-censorship 
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Most interviewees experienced direct pressure from politicians and business 
executives through threatening phone calls and private conversations in which they 
are asked “why they wrote this or that.” Intimidation includes being bullied and 
shouted at in public, being followed, receiving messages via third parties, hints about 
what can be done to them if they don’t stop investigating, and tapping their phones. 
Non-governmental organizations such as RWB and CPJ note that aggression against 
journalists is all too common. Criminal and mafia-like organizations and local 
business barons dictate what is and is not reported by targeting journalists who dare 
expose illegal activities. Often, journalists believe crime organizations work in 
tandem with legitimate institutions such as police and security services. A senior 
investigative reporter at a daily newspaper says: 
I have been threatened directly. I am very careful not to have a telephone at 
home because they used to check my calls. In 2005 or 2006 someone called 
my neighbour to pass a message to me that they will put a bomb in my flat.  
Most interviewees know colleagues who have been beaten, stabbed, punched, 
kicked, verbally abused by criminals, or had their cars torched. In 2006, a TV 
investigative reporter barely escaped with his life after a bomb exploded in his flat 
following his investigation into prison corruption (CPJ, 2006; Novinite, 2006). Recent 
examples include the brutal beating of the owner of local news website Zad Kulisiteii 
(CPJ, 2016; IREX, 2017). The effect of such aggression is cause for major concern 
for participants, as fear of retribution and the impunity of perpetrators create a chilling 
effect on investigative reporting. Journalists appear resigned to the fact that 
censorship is “not necessarily the all-seeing eye and iron fist of a distant authority 
which towers over its subjects” (Keene, 1991, pp. 38-39). Instead, censorship has 
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been made redundant by self-censorship, which constantly reminds them not to go too 
far and warns them what is at risk: jobs, livelihoods, and future careers.  
Discussion and conclusions 
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, a familiar pattern has emerged from many 
third-wave democracies such as Bulgaria. First, their societies undergo a volatile, 
painful, and turbulent process of transformation, “a figurative rollercoaster of 
emotions, fears, and expectations” (Hadland, 2015, p. 4). Second, a new political 
breakthrough allows a brief but exciting period of almost unlimited freedom for the 
press. The media find themselves fulfilling a dual function of not just transmitting 
information but also catalyzing political change. A survey of 102 journalists, just 
three months after these changes began in 1989, found they believed the press had 
freed itself from most communist taboos and restrictions in that very short time 
(Ognianova & Scott, 1997). Two decades later, a survey of 100 journalists showed 
that new and sophisticated methods of regulatory and market censorship severely 
restricted media and journalistic freedom ever since the early years of democratization 
(Blagov et al., 2014). Political office and media ownership often combine as 
“mutually reinforcing resources of influence” (Voltmer, 2013, p. 225) on journalism. 
Third, in the final transitional stage, authorities, including the state and dominant 
elites, establish full control of their countries by subtly repressive practices. These 
include continuous assaults on media freedom through legal, political, and financial 
mechanisms that strike at the heart of hard-won journalistic freedom and 
independence (Hadland, 2015). Bulgarian journalists believe the main threat to media 
freedom and journalism is not direct state control or censorship but crippling financial 
and economic dependency on political, business, crime, and media elites. Few 
independent private media outlets are able or willing to hold power to account, while 
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those who do are punished with the withdrawal of advertising or sponsorship. The 
hands of public broadcaster journalists have long been tied by their full dependency 
on state funding, political appointments of their leadership, and firing of outspoken 
and critical journalists. At the same time, the public is deeply dissatisfied with the 
overall quality of the media in their country (IREX, 2017).  
  While some relative freedom of speech and expression exists post-
communism, journalists still tread a difficult and sometimes dangerous path, most 
know exactly what they can and cannot say, publish or broadcast, and they are fully 
aware that their media outlets and livelihoods depend heavily on whomever provides 
with money to survive. As a result, negative trends plague the media landscape: 
widespread self-censorship, lack of pluralism, and a culture of fear.  
Government, political, and corporate interference since 1989, along with 
growing financial dependency, are the main reasons today’s journalists tend to view 
the media and journalists as no longer the positive force in society they once were, but 
as submissive, subservient, and failing to fulfil the purpose of being the fourth estate 
in Bulgarian society. On the contrary: Journalists have come full circle since the end 
of communism -- again being powerful instruments of the ruling elite.  
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